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Revisionist scholars have recently challenged the hornbook rule that United States
federal courts shall determine questions of customary international law as federal law.
The revisionists claim that the traditional rule violates constitutional history and
doctrine, and offends fundamental principles of separation of powers, federalism, and
democracy. Professor Koh rebuts the revisionist challenge, applying each of the
revisionists' own stated criteria. He demonstrates that the lawful and sensible practice
of treating international law as federal law should be left undisturbed by both the
political and judicial branches.
How should we understand the following passages?
[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law.'
Customary international law is federal law, to be enunciated authorita-
tively by the federal courts.2
International human rights cases predictably raise legal issues - such as
interpretations of international law - that are matters of Federal common
law and within the particular expertise of Federal courts.3
Taking these passages at face value, most readers would under-
stand them to mean just what they say: judicial determinations of in-
ternational law - including international human rights law - are
matters of federal law. That these three declarations emanate from the
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I am grateful to Mark Templeton for excellent research assistance, to Gene Coakley and Renee
DeMatteo for selfless support, and to Akhil Amar, Drew Days, Bill Dodge, Bob Ellickson, John
Hart Ely, Dick Fallon, Willy Fletcher, Ryan Goodman, Louis Henkin, Derek Jinks, Paul Kahn,
Larry Lessig, Gerry Neuman, David Shapiro, David Strauss, and Kenji Yoshino for incisive
comments. I should note that I have participated in a number of the lawsuits discussed in this
essay as a government or private attorney. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. x995) (co-
counsel for Doe plaintiffs); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at x, Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 470 U.S. oo3 (1985) (No. 83-2052) (co-author), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 427, 427
(I985). I have also participated as a discussion leader in the Aspen Institute Seminar for Judges
on International Human Rights Law: Its Application in National Jurisprudence. See infra note
192.
I Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (z964) (emphasis added).
2 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at i, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. i98o) (No. 79-6090) (emphasis added), reprinted in ig I.L.M. 585, 6o6 n.49 (1980).
3 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 6 n.6 (iggi) (emphasis added) (explaining the Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act (TVPA) of '991, 28 U.S.C. § 135o note (I994)).
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federal judicial, executive, and legislative branches, respectively, only
confirms the unanimity of relevant opinion on the subject.
As so often happens, the hornbook rule - international law, as ap-
plied in the United States, must be federal law - makes obvious
sense. Every schoolchild knows that the failures of the Articles of
Confederation led to the framing of the Constitution, which estab-
lished national governmental institutions to articulate uniform posi-
tions on such uniquely federal matters as foreign affairs and interna-
tional law.4 Even as the new Constitution withheld foreign affairs
powers from the states,s it authorized a national institution, Congress,
"[tlo define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations. '6
But Congress's authority to construe the law of nations was never ex-
clusive.7 The early Supreme Court spent much of its time deciding
cases under the law of nations." International law came to occupy "an
4 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., ig6i) ("If we
are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."). Both Ed-
mund Randolph and James Madison complained at the Constitutional Convention about the
Continental Congress's inability to give effect to the law of nations under the Articles of Confed-
eration. See FREDERICK W. MARKS 1l, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 145 (2d ed. 1986); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 29 (1996); i THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 24-25, 316-17 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
5 The Constitution bars states from making treaties, alliances, agreements, or compacts with
foreign powers without the consent of Congress. It also bars them from engaging in war unless
invaded, and forbids them to lay imposts or duties on imports or exports without the consent of
Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § io. In addition, the Constitution declares the law and trea-
ties of the United States to be supreme over contrary state law. See id. art. VI, § 2. Throughout
this essay, I capitalize "State" when referring to nation-states, and use the lower case when refer-
ring to a state of the federal union of the United States.
6 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. io. For a history of this clause, see Charles D. Siegal, Deference and Its
Dangers: Congress' Power to "Define ... Offenses Against the Law of Nations", 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 865 (1988). No less an originalist than Robert Bork acknowledges that this pro-
vision was motivated by the Framers' recognition that "[i]mplementation of the law of nations by
the American government was ... crucial to the conduct of our foreign relations, a subject of per-
vasive concern in the Constitution." Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 2455 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,
J.), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
7 In 1789, the Continental Congress expressly resolved that the United States would cause the
"law of nations to be most strictly observed." 14 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
1774-1789, at 635 (i9o9). The Framers never suggested, however, that the federal courts' power
to construe customary international law should be somehow subordinated to the concurrent
authority of the political branches to define the law of nations. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No.
64, at 394 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 296i) ("All constitutional acts of power, whether in the
executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they pro-
ceeded from the legislature.").
8 See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) ("'IThe United States had, by
taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations .... "). In
1815, Chief Justice Marshall declared that "the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a
part of the law of the land." The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (181S) (emphasis added). It
seems unlikely that the Chief Justice would have understood the Supreme Court to be "bound by
the law of nations" had that law merely represented the law of the several states. Nor, given the
attention paid by the Marshall Court to piracy cases, the precursors of modern human rights
cases, is it plausible to argue that U.S. courts have only recently begun to enforce human rights
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existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress." 9 By
I98i, the Supreme Court had come unanimously to "recogniz[e] the
need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come
to be known as 'federal common law"' in cases in which "a federal
rule of decision is 'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,"' in-
cluding "international disputes implicating ... our relations with for-
eign nations."' 0
There matters stood until the last volume of this Law Review,
when Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith launched an en-
ergetic assault upon this body of settled law." In Customary Interna-
tional Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Posi-
tion, Bradley and Goldsmith argue that the "ascendancy of CIL [their
term for customary international law] to the status of federal common
law" is of recent vintage.12  The federalization of customary interna-
tional law, they claim, stems not from traditional constitutional con-
cerns about supremacy, uniformity, and the federal interest in interna-
tional affairs, but rather from "a combination of troubling
developments, including mistaken interpretations of history, doctrinal
bootstrapping by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law,
and academic fiat."'13 Moreover, they claim, the so-called "modern po-
sition" conjured by this academic hijacking operation "depart[s] from
well-accepted notions of American representative democracy, federal
common law, separation of powers, and federalism."1 4 In more recent
writing, they have extended their challenge into a curious broadside
decrying The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Liti-
gation. -5
norms. See generally G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy
Cases, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 727 (1989) (discussing the attention given by the Marshall Court to in-
ternational law in piracy cases).
9 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. ig8o); accord United States v. Buck,
69o F. Supp. 1291, 1297 (S.D.N.Y. r988). For extensive discussions of the early case law, see Ed-
win D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, iox U.
PA. L. REV. 26 (1952); Edwin Dewitt Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law
of the United States, II, ioi U. PA. L. REv. 792 (1952); and Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of
Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819 (1989).
10 Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 64o-41 (ig8i) (quoting Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)).
11 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Com-
mon Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, iio HARV.,L. R v. 81S (997) [hereinafter Bradley




15 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human
Rights Litigation, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Current
Illegitimacy].
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Bradley and Goldsmith's position is not entirely novel, 16 and their
democracy talk may have superficial appeal for those not well steeped
in the fields of international and foreign affairs law. Their anti-
judicial-activism rhetoric makes for lively and provocative reading,
which may account for the academic attention their piece has already
attracted. 17 But even casual reflection compels the conclusion that
Bradley and Goldsmith are utterly mistaken.
This Commentary evaluates Bradley and Goldsmith's challenge
and demonstrates that it fails on its own terms. Under each of the
authors' stated criteria - history and doctrine, separation of powers,
federalism, and democratic values' 8 - their position is untenable and
certainly far less credible than the traditional view they assail. Even
cursory review makes clear that Bradley and Goldsmith have proposed
a rather startling nonsolution to a nonproblem. For under current
practice, federal courts regularly incorporate norms of customary in-
ternational law into federal law. Bradley and Goldsmith urge instead
a rule whereby "federal courts should not apply [customary interna-
tional law] as federal law without some authorization to do so by the
federal political branches." 9 As we shall see, their rule would foster
none of the values that they favor. Instead, their proposal would oust
a sensible, settled rule that all three federal branches and the fifty
states have consistently followed in favor of a muddled notion that of-
fers only an invitation to chaos.
I. BRADLEY AND GOLDSMITH'S PROPOSAL
Bradley and Goldsmith's initial article spends so much time at-
tacking the settled view that customary international law is federal law
that it leaves unclear precisely what their alternative might be. Given
our three-tiered hierarchy of constitutional, federal, and state law, one
might reasonably deduce that if international law is neither constitu-
tional nor federal law, it must be state law, that is, rules of customary
international law may be remade selectively by state legislatures and
16 See, e.g., Phillip R. THrmble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 665 (1986); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20
YALE J.INT'LL. I (r995).
17 Most of the early commentary has been both critical and, in my view, correct. See, e.g.,
Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and
Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAm L. REV. 463 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense
About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66
FoRDHA L. REV. 371 (I997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land. Customary International
Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAm L. REv. 393 (i997). The first response in these
pages noted that Bradley and Goldsmith had attempted to make a commonly accepted practice
contestable without deeply examining why the proposition that international law is federal law
had been deemed incontestable in the first place. See Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume
rio: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, rio HARv. L. REv. 1785, 1796-97 (i997).
18 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 82o-21.
19 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note I5, at 349.
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common law decisions.20 Yet Bradley and Goldsmith's most recent
writing denies that their view "require[s] that CIL be a matter of state
common law."21  Instead, they claim, "in most cases, states would
rarely incorporate CIL into state law" and thus "[i]n this circumstance,
CIL simply would not be a rule of decision in federal court."
22
Thus unveiled, the Bradley and Goldsmith position emerges as
even more radical than it first appears. For if customary international
law is neither federal nor state law (unless specifically incorporated by
the state or federal political branches), then in most cases, customary
international law is not United States law at all! In effect, Bradley
and Goldsmith argue for the near complete ouster of customary inter-
national law rules from federal judicial interpretation. Yet such a po-
sition would utterly violate "[tihe Framers' Constitution[, which] an-
ticipated that international disputes would regularly come before the
United States courts and that the decisions in those cases could rest on
principles of international law, without any necessary reference to the
common law or to constitutional doctrines."
23
At a minimum, one would expect substantial policy justification
before such a dramatic reversal of settled doctrine could be asserted by
"academic fiat." Yet Bradley and Goldsmith mount virtually no ar-
guments explaining why fifty state courts and legislatures should be
free to reject, modify, reinterpret, selectively incorporate, or completely
oust customary international law rules from domestic law. Under
Bradley and Goldsmith's view, absent an explicit and unambiguous
directive from a federal statute or treaty, state courts or legislatures
could simply refuse to incorporate into state law customary interna-
tional rules regarding the non-execution of pregnant women2 4 or the
20 Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 87o ("If a state
chooses to incorporate CIL into state law, then the federal courts would be bound to apply the
state interpretation of CIL on issues not otherwise governed by federal law. If a state did not, in
fact, incorporate CI. into state law, the federal court would not be authorized to apply CIL as
federal or state law.").
21 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 15, at 349.
22 Id. at 349-50 (emphasis added).
23 White, supra note 8, at 727. Moreover, by advocating the elimination of customary interna-
tional law as a rule of decision in this country, Bradley and Goldsmith propose to nullify the Su-
preme Court's century-old pronouncement that "[ilnternational aw is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added).
24 Article 1(2) of the Senate's reservation to its advice and consent to ratification of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. ig, 1966), pur-
ports to preserve the discretion of the United States to impose capital punishment on any duly
convicted person "other than a pregnant woman." Reservation No. 1, 138 CONG. REC. S4 783
(daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). Yet another statement attached by the Senate "declares that the provi-
sions of Articles i through 27 of the Covenant [including Article 6.5, the relevant right-to-life pro-
vision of the Covenant] are not self-executing." Declaration No. i, 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (1992).
The executive branch has not yet sought any implementing legislation for the ICCPR.
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immunity of visiting heads of state.2- Alternatively, each state could
adopt its own parochial answer to each of these questions. Thus, for
example, the Bradley and Goldsmith theory would allow Massachu-
setts to deny the customary international law protection of head-of-
state immunity to Queen Elizabeth on tort claims arising out of events
in Northern Ireland, whereas the forty-nine other states could choose
instead to grant the Queen every conceivable variant of full or partial
immunity.26 Yet surely, such issues raise precisely the kind of "basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members
of the international community" that the Supreme Court held "must be
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law."
'27
Many scholars question persuasively whether the United States declaration has either domes-
tic or international legal effect See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States
Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REV.
SIS, 527 (iggi); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 345-48 (1995). But under Bradley and Goldsmith's
analysis, such declarations "make clear that the political branches have not generally authorized
the application of the norms embodied in the treaties as domestic federal law." Bradley & Gold-
smith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 870. Thus, under their reasoning, even if
the universal practice among States indicated a customary international law norm against the
execution of pregnant women, the legislatures and courts of the states of the United States would
be free to ignore that norm.
2S In the United States, head-of-state immunity is a customary international law defense that
has been incorporated into federal common law. See, e.g., Suggestion of Immunity of the United
States, Domingo v. Marcos, No. C82-1o55-V, slip op. (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 1982), reprinted in
MARIAN NASH (LEICH), DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U1 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAV 1981-x988, at 1565 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 DIGEST OF U.S.
PRACTICE] (successfully urging that civil suit against then-Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos
be dismissed because "[u]nder customary rules of international law, recognized and applied in the
United States, the head of a foreign government, its foreign ministers, and those designated by the
head of state as members of his official party are immune from the jurisdiction of the U.S. Federal
and State courts").
26 Or, one might imagine a sympathetic state judge or legislator choosing to construe interna-
tional law to treat escaped Irish Republican Army soldiers as prisoners of war. In United States
v. Buck, 69o F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (mem.), for example, the defendants moved to dismiss
a federal indictment on the grounds that they were immune from prosecution as prisoners of war.
See id. at 1292. In response to interrogatories from the federal judge, the U.S. attorney asserted
that the United States's customary international law obligations regarding prisoner of war status
were set forth in Article 4 of the unratified Geneva Convention Relative to the Prisoners of War of
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, and Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which he
claimed only applied during international armed conflicts. See In 1988 DIGEST OF U.S.
PRACTICE, supra note 25, at 3439 (quoting Memorandum prepared by U.S. Department of State
Office of Legal Adviser (Mar. 29, 1988), in United States v. Shakur, 69o F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (Nos. 84 Cr. 22o-CSH, SSS 82 Cr. 3 12-CSH) (calling these provisions "the current obliga-
tions of customary international law on according prisoner-of-war status")). See generally Theo-
dor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (1987) (arguing
that the Geneva Conventions are declaratory of customary international law). The federal judge
accepted the Government's reasoning, and denied defendants' motion to dismiss. See Buck, 69o
F. Supp. at 1303. But under Bradley and Goldsmith's reasoning, a state judge hearing a similar
claim apparently would have been free to redetermine the matter, and the federal courts would
thereafter have been bound to follow that result.
27 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
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H. HISTORY AND DOCTRINE
To defend their view, Bradley and Goldsmith first invoke history
and doctrine. But their account turns critically on a serious misread-
ing of two landmark Supreme Court cases: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins28 and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.2 9 Because forests
have been felled to discuss both cases, I need not describe their
broader doctrinal contours here.30  Suffice it to say that Bradley and
Goldsmith accept that customary international law was part of the
English common law that became common law for both the colonies
and the fledgling United States.3 ' Until 1842, federal and state courts
alike construed customary international law with little regard to its
federal or state character. Both federal and state courts applied the
private international law rules of the law merchant (lex mercatoria) in
an effort to construct a uniform national commercial law.32 In cases
involving admiralty and alien torts, customary international law di-
rectly provided the rules of decision for federal courts.
33
Swift v. Tyson 34 clarified that the bill of exchange rules derived
from lex mercatoria constituted part of the "general common law" to
28 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
30 For commentary on Erie, see, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 688, 694-702 (iq89); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693
(I974); and Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964). On Sabbatino, see, for example, Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs
Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964), and Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, oo YALE LJ. 2347, 2362-64 (99x).
31 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 822-23; Louis
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1555-61 (1984).
32 See generally R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND COMMON LAW
(1977); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
5789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1S3 (1984) (arguing that, long before
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (i6 Pet.) x (1842), federal courts employed the general common law as an
important part of their working jurisprudence); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pts.
I & 2), 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1042-53 (1985) (discussing the origins of federal common law in
the context of political history); Koh, supra note 3o, at 2351-58 (discussing the evolution of
American courts' treatment of the law of nations).
33 Admiralty, maritime, and prize cases were heard in federal jurisdiction under the predeces-
sor statute to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994). Alien tort cases were heard under the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA), now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (x994). See id. ('The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."). For a discussion of the relationship between the
ATCA and the common law, see William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Stat-
ute: A Response to the "Originalists," ig HASTINGS INT'L & Comsp. L. REv. 221, 231-37 (1996).
For a discussion of the relationship between the early maritime prize cases and suits under the
ATCA, see David J. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 31, 5o-69
(x995), reviewing J.H.W. VERZIJL, W.P. HEERE & J.P.S. OFFERHAUS, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, VOL. ii, PART IX-c: THE LAW OF MARITIME PRIZE (1992). As
Bederman explains, "from time immemorial, when a national court adjudicated a case of a mari-
time capture it was obliged to follow international law." Id. at 51.
34 41 U.S. (x6 Pet.) 1 (1842).
1830 [VOL. 111:1824
HeinOnline -- 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1830 1997-1998
IS INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY STATE LAW?
be interpreted by federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction.35
Thereafter, federal courts construed both commercial and noncommer-
cial rules of customary international law so regularly that Justice Gray
provoked no dissent when he wrote: "International law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice
of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination."36
There matters stood until Erie, in which Justice Brandeis famously
invoked federalism concerns to pronounce that "[t]here is no federal
general common law."37 Curiously, Bradley and Goldsmith read Erie
as effecting a near complete ouster of federal courts from their tradi-
tional role in construing customary international law norms. But
nothing in Justice Brandeis's opinion suggests that he intended to un-
seat more than a century of settled law on that question.
Erie held that the grant of diversity jurisdiction, standing alone,
did not authorize the federal courts to make a general federal common
law of tort.38 But customary international law differs from the state
tort law at issue in Erie in at least three crucial respects. First, Justice
Brandeis claimed, the federal courts lack power to fashion common
law tort rules in part because "Congress has no power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable in a [s]tate."39 But given both
Congress's enumerated authority to define and punish offenses against
the law of nations and its affirmative exercise of that power in a range
of statutes, no one could similarly claim that federal courts lacked
power to make federal common law rules with respect to international
law.40
Second, as Justice Harlan later noted, Erie required that state law
be the governing substantive law in diversity cases because "the
scheme of our Constitution envisions an allocation of law-making func-
tions between state and federal legislative processes which is undercut
if the federal judiciary can make substantive law affecting state affairs
beyond the bounds of congressional legislative powers in this re-
gard."41 But with respect to international and foreign affairs law, the
Constitution envisions no similar role for state legislative or judicial
process. Federal judicial determination of most questions of custom-
35 See id. at 8-12.
36 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (i9oo). The quotation from The Paquete Habana is
almost identical to language from another opinion also authored by Justice Gray. See Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
37 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
38 See id.
39 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
40 For examples of statutes enacted pursuant to this constitutional provision, see Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); Piracy Act, Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. i2, 113-
I4; and Piracy Act of 1790, § 28, 1 Stat. ri8, criminalizing assaults upon ambassadors.
41 Hanna v. Plumer, 38o U.S. 460, 474-75 (i965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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ary international law transpires not in a zone of core state concerns,
such as state tort law, but in a foreign affairs area in which the Tenth
Amendment has reserved little or no power to the states. It was pre-
cisely to preserve the federal common lawmaking power of the federal
courts in such areas that Justice Brandeis acknowledged - on the
very same day that Erie was decided - that federal judges may con-
tinue to make specialized federal common law regarding issues of
uniquely federal concern.
42
Third, to treat determinations of customary international law as
questions of state law would have rendered both state court and fed-
eral diversity rulings effectively unreviewable by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Such unreviewability would have raised the specter that multi-
ple variants of the same international law rule could proliferate among
the several states.
43
Writing only one year after Erie, Professor (later World Court
Judge) Philip Jessup noted these three problems in arguing that "the
holding of th[at] case has no direct application to international law":44
If the dictum of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Tompkins case is to be applied
broadly, it would follow that hereafter a state court's determination of a
rule of international law would be a finding regarding the law of the state
and would not be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
.... [A]ny attempt to extend the doctrine of the Tompkins case to in-
ternational law should [thus] be repudiated by the Supreme Court. Mr.
Justice Brandeis was surely not thinking of international law when he
wrote his dictum. Any question of applying international law in our
courts involves the foreign relations of the United States and can thus be
42 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (stat-
ing that the issue of interstate water apportionment "is a question of 'federal common law' upon
which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive"). Significantly, in
deciding the interstate apportionment issue before the Court in Hinderlider, Justice Brandeis
cited two earlier judicial interpretations of customary international law. See id. at io6 (quoting
Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (ii Pet.) 185, 209 (1837) (explaining that "the general right of sovereignty,
belonging to independent nations, to establish and fix the disputed boundaries between their re-
spective territories ... is a doctrine universally recognized in the law and practice of nations" and
equally belongs to the states of the Union)); id. at i1O (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U.S. 46, 97
(1907) ("Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic, tribunal, we apply Federal
law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand."
(quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902)) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
43 In Erie, Justice Brandeis had assailed Swift for "attempting to promote uniformity of law
throughout the United States [and thus] ... prevent[ing] uniformity in the administration of the
law of the [s]tate." Erie, 304 U.S. at 75. But if customary international law were treated as part
of the new specialized federal common law, which is both binding on state and federal courts and
subject to Supreme Court review, the uniformity of international legal rules could be maintained
both throughout the United States and within the individual states. Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 287-88 (1875) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (warning of the dangers if the rights
and responsibilities of U.S. citizens under the laws of war were not governed by federal law sub-
ject to Supreme Court review).
44 Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law,
33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 741-43 (1939).
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brought within afederal power.... The several states of the Union are en-
tities unknown to international law. It would be as unsound as it would
be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing
the rules of international law.
45
More than a quarter century would pass before the Supreme Court
clarified whether customary international law rules should be charac-
terized as state or federal law.46 In 1964, the Supreme Court took up
each of Jessup's concerns in Sabbatino. First, Justice Harlan, writing
for an 8-1 majority, did not shy away from interpreting questions of
customary international law (which, if Bradley and Goldsmith were
right, would have raised no substantial federal question worthy of Su-
preme Court review).47 To the contrary, the Court construed custom-
ary international law to determine that international law neither com-
pelled nor required application of the act of state doctrine.
48
Second, Justice Harlan recognized Jessup's distinction between
cases that fall within zones of state and federal power. Given the mis-
chief that would ensue if each state could formulate its own act of
state rule,49 Justice Harlan concluded, any "issue concerned with a ba-
sic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and
the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other mem-
45 Id. at 741-43 (emphasis added).
46 Nine years after Jessup's article appeared, the Second Circuit decided Bergman v. De
Sieyes, 17o F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948), which followed a New York state court interpretation granting
diplomatic immunity from civil process in a diversity action. Judge Hand, writing for the court,
did not foreclose the possibility that "an avowed refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of
international law, or a plain misapprehension of it" would present a federal question. Id. at 361.
Hand's own law clerk, Louis Henkin, characterizes Bergman as one of Hand's "rare mistakes" for
failing to address Jessup's Erie concerns. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 4o n.21 (2d ed. 1996); see id. at 51o n.i9. Writing two years before the
Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino, Covey Oliver, who later became a judge on the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, similarly noted the tension between Bergman and Jessup's 1939 article,
and presciently predicted that "before the problem is finally settled Jessup's views of 1939 will
prevail." Covey Oliver, Philip C. Jessups Continuing Contribution to International Law, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 1132, 1135 (1962).
Although Bradley and Goldsmith give significance to the Second Circuit's isolated ruling in
Bergman, see Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 828 & n.75,
834, that ruling now has little precedential weight, having been overruled sub silentio by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Sabbatino. Since Sabbatino, no federal court has cited, much less fol-
lowed, Bergman. Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals has cited it only in a case in which
the court ultimately followed the federal executive branch's amicus brief, which had asserted that
customary international law is federal law after Sabbatino. See Republic of Argentina v. City of
New York, 25o N.E.2d 698, 701 (N.Y. i969); Neuman, supra note 17, at 377.
47 Nor did Justice White's powerful dissent anywhere challenge the majority's conclusion that
federal law governed. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 450-56 (1964)
(White, J., dissenting).
48 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-24.
49 See id. at 424 ("If ... the state courts are left free to formulate their own [act of state] rules,
the purposes behind the doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had been no fed-
eral pronouncement on the subject.").
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bers of the international community must be treated exclusively as an
aspect of federal law."50
Third and finally, the Court cited with approval Judge Jessup's
recognition of "the potential dangers were Erie extended to legal
problems affecting international relations."5' The Court noted Jessup's
concern for maintaining national uniformity in interpretation of legal
rules, and his "cautionf] that rules of international law should not be
left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations." 52  Jes-
sup's "basic rationale," the Sabbatino Court concluded, "is equally ap-
plicable to the act of state doctrine."53
The most plausible reading of this language is that the Sabbatino
Court simply confirmed Jessup's understanding that "rules of interna-
tional law should not be left to divergent and.., parochial state inter-
pretations." 4 A fortiori, the same reasoning must be "equally applica-
ble" to interpretation of the act of state doctrine, which the Court had
not found to be compelled by customary international law.-s Far from
denying the appropriateness of federal courts' making federal common
law rules based on their interpretation of international law, Justice
Harlan declared it "apparent that the greater the degree of codification
or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it,
since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed princi-
ple to circumstances of fact."
5 6
In the decades since Sabbatino, the Supreme Court has routinely
held that a "few areas, involving 'uniquely federal interests,' are so
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal
control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by
federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive)
by the courts - so-called 'federal common law."' 57  The Court has
50 Id. at 425.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 Id.
55 Id. This point becomes even clearer when one reads this language in the context of the full
paragraph:
However, we are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in or-
dering our relationships with other members of the international community must be
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law. It seems fair to assume that the Court did
not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins. Soon thereafter, Professor Philip C. Jessup, now a judge of the International Court of
Justice, recognized the potential dangers were Erie extended to legal problems affecting in-
ternational relations. He cautioned that rules of international law should not be left to di-
vergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. His basic rationale is equally applica-
ble to the act of state doctrine.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
56 Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
57 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (citation omitted).
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specifically found such a "distinctive federal interest in ... 'the exte-
rior relation of this whole nation with other nations and govern-
ments. "'
5 8
The proper reading of this doctrine, in my view, is that even after
Erie and Sabbatino, federal courts retain legitimate authority to incor-
porate bona fide rules of customary international law into federal
common law. This judicial authority inheres not just in the distinct
federal interest in foreign relations, but also in the explicit grant of
authority in Article I, Section 8, Clause io of the Constitution to define
and fashion federal rules with regard to the law of nations, various
other constitutional provisions, 9 and particular federal statutes.
60
Once customary norms have sufficiently crystallized, courts should
presumptively incorporate them into federal common law, unless the
norms have been ousted as law for the United States by contrary fed-
eral directives.
61
58 Id. at 5o8 n.4 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (194) (quoting Henderson v.
Wickham, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1876))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
S9 See U.S. CONST. art. fI, § 2 ("[The federal] judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority," as well as to various cases involving ambassadors
and controversies with "foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."); id. art. 1, §§ 2-3 (vesting in the
President, a federal entity, certain foreign affairs powers, and directing the President to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed," including, presumably, customary international law); id. art.
VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States," which presumptively include bona fide rules of cus-
tomary international law, "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby."). With respect to rules affecting foreign commerce, the Foreign Com-
merce Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, also provides a grant of constitutional authority sufficiently ca-
pacious to bring customary international law rules developed in the commercial area within the
federal lawmaking power. Cf. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 n.25 (citing many of these same consti-
tutional provisions as "reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign
nations and indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of
federal institutions"). For a discussion of the interaction among these provisions, see generally
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67-77 (i990).
60 Specific federal statutes, such as the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § i35o (1994), and the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ x602-z61i (1976), expressly delegate to the federal courts
authority to derive federal common law rules from established norms of customary international
law. See 28 U.S.C. § 16o5(a)(3) (x994) (abrogating foreign sovereign immunity in any case in
which, inter alia, "rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue"). Under
each of these statutes, a "national body of federal-court-built law has been held to have been con-
templated" by the statute, in the same way that the Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), held that such a body of law was contemplated by section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 12o, 61 Stat. 136, 156-57 (i947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994)). Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426; see Koh, supra note 3o, at 2368
n.i18.
61 For example, contrary norms embodied in the Constitution, federal treaties or statutes, or
controlling and valid presidential acts may supersede the application of customary international
law rules as law for the United States. My approach differs from Professor Henkin's, inasmuch
as I believe that customary international law is federal common law (not simply "like federal
common law"). Compare Henkin, supra note 30, at 1561-65, with Koh, supra note 3o, at 2368
n.ai8, 2386. As I understand it, federal judges exercise post-Erie federal common lawmaking
authority to incorporate crystallized rules of customary international law into U.S. federal law,
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Applying this authority in First National City Bank v. Banco Para
el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec),62 Justice O'Connor found "the
principles governing this case are common to both international law
and federal common law."63 Similarly, in a string of decisions deter-
mining the legal status of submerged offshore areas, the Court has ap-
plied customary international law rules to guide its interpretation of
federal statutory and treaty provisions.64 Moreover, both the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts have regularly looked to customary
international law rules when applying the felicitously named "Charm-
ing Betsy" principle, a canon of statutory construction that directs that
"an act of [C]ongress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
which are in turn perennially subject to modification by political branch action. One need not
enter further into the substantial scholarly debate that has raged over whether the President may
or may not violate customary international law on the President's own authority to notice that
none of the participants in that debate subscribe to Bradley and Goldsmith's view regarding the
domestic status of customary international law. See, e.g., Thmble, supra note x6; Agora, May the
President Violate Customary International Law?, 8o AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986) [hereinafter
Agora, Customary International Law I] (essays by Jonathan I. Charney, Michael J. Glennon, and
Louis Henkin); Agora, May the President iolate Customary International Law? (Cont'd), 8x AM.
J. INT'L L. 371 (1987) [hereinafter Agora, Customary International Law II] (essays by Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., Anthony D'Amato, and Jordan J. Paust).
62 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
63 Id. at 623. More recently, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993),
Justice Scalia, writing for four dissenting Justices, found that "the practice of using international
law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence," and
thus should have barred the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in that case. Id. at 8x8
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Souter's majority opinion did not expressly address the interna-
tional law question. For analysis of these opinions, see generally William S. Dodge, Extraterrito-
riality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J.
101, 135-43 (1998).
64 During the past 40 years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to customary interna-
tional law to aid its determinations regarding title to lands and islands in "historic waters" off par-
ticular state coast lines. See United States v. Alaska, 117 S. Ct. 1888, 1897-99 (1997) (holding un-
der international law that the United States had properly constructed baselines in part of the
Beaufort Sea); United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 & n.xo (1992) (considering arguments
based on the baseline provisions of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the United
States asserted as customary international law, to determine an executive official's statutory
authority to condition a permit); United States v. Louisiana (The Alabama and Mississippi
Boundary Case), 470 U.S. 93, io6-07 (x985) (applying customary international law to define the
term "historic bay" in the z958 Territorial Sea Convention); United States v. Maine (The Rhode
Island and New York Boundary Case), 469 U.S. 504, 526 (1985) (holding that Long Island and
Block Island Sounds constituted a "juridical bay," and that their waters were therefore internal
state waters); United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 202-04 (975) (applying similar reasoning to
determine that Alaska's Cook Inlet did not meet the criteria for "historic waters"); United States v.
Louisiana, 394 U.S. 1i, 22 (1969) (applying "generally accepted principles of international law" to
deny Louisiana's claim of historic title to certain coastal waters); United States v. California, 381
U.S. 139, 164-65 (1965) (construing the Submerged Lands Act in light of, inter alia, customary
international law); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 66-82 (i96o) (holding that Louisiana,
Alabama, and Mississippi were not entitled to a historic seaward boundary greater than three
geographical miles from their coastlines). Needless to say, none of these cases could have been
uncontroversially decided had the rules of decision been subject to the state law of one of the in-
terested jurisdictions. Cf Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 (comparing "[t]he considerations supporting
exclusion of state authority here" to those in an early submerged lands case).
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nations, if any other possible construction remains."65 Finally, in addi-
tion to their numerous rulings under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA),66 lower federal courts have determined customary interna-
tional rules to be federal common law with regard to such diverse mat-
65 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, xi8 (x8o4) (Marshall, C.J.).
These decisions have construed federal statutes in light of both treaties and customary interna-
tional law rules, without drawing sharp distinctions between the domestic legal status of each.
For examples of decisions construing federal statutes in light of treaties, see TPans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982);
and United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. I988). Numer-
ous decisions have construed federal statutes in light of customary international law, a practice
that would make little sense if customary international law were state law. See, e.g., McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (x963) (holding that a proposed
construction of the National Labor Relations Act would have been contrary to a "well-established
rule of international law"); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (holding that the Jones
Act should not be construed to apply to extraterritorial acts of foreigners done on a foreign ship);
Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) ("[Wle are asked to review a statute which both Congress
and successive Presidents have declared to be necessary to fulfill our obligations under ... cus-
tomary international law ....); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487,
493-94 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (refusing to enforce extraterritorial service of agency subpoena on grounds
that broad reading of the statute would violate customary rules regarding extraterritorial applica-
tion of enforcement jurisdiction); FTC v. Compagnie de Sant-Gobain-Pont-b-Mousson, 636 F.2d
23001 1304, 1323 n.130 (D.C. Cir. i98o) (same); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373,
I379-8o (zith Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983) (stating that jurisdiction cannot "ex-
ceed the bounds of international law"); United States v. James-Robinson, 5 5 F. Supp. 134o, 1346-
47 (S.D. Fla. I981) (same with respect to the Marijuana on the High Seas Act, PUB. L. No. 96-
350, 94 Stat. 1159 (i98o)). See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role ofInternational Law As a
Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (iggo) (discussing many of
these cases).
66 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 817 n.3 (citing
cases); see generally Clyde H. Crockett, The Role of Federal Common Law in Alien Tort Statute
Cases, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 29 (r99I) (discussing cases).
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ters as expropriation, 67 treaty interpretation, 68 extradition, 69 official
immunity,70 and treatment of prisoners71 and detainees.
72
These decisions amply illustrate the broader incoherence of the
Bradley and Goldsmith approach. For the capacity of the federal
courts to incorporate customary international law into federal law -
unless ousted by contrary federal directive - is absolutely critical to
maintaining the coherence of federal law in areas of international con-
cern. With certain exceptions, placing all international law on a fed-
eral, subconstitutional plane gives customary international law a lexi-
cal comparability with treaties and statutes, which are superior to state
law under the Supremacy Clause.73 Federal court decisions in the in-
ternational field thus frequently rely on a blend of federal statutory
and treaty interpretation, customary international law, and federal
common law to fashion federal rules of decision that are often later
formalized in new treaties or statutes.
In the Bancec case, for example, the Court derived a federal rule
regarding the piercing of the corporate veil of foreign government enti-
ties from federal common law rules, as "necessarily informed both by
international law principles and by articulated congressional poli-
cies."74 Similarly, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,75 five
Justices evaluated the extraterritorial reach of the federal antitrust law
67 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 891-93 (2d Cir.
i98i) (finding that under customary international law, Cuba was obligated to pay either "appro-
priate" or "full" compensation for a taking).
68 See, e.g., Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 355 E Supp. 1155, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (applying interna-
tional law rules to determine whether an extradition treaty still validly existed between India and
the United States).
69 See, e.g., Fiocconi v. Attorney General, 462 F.2d 475, 479-80 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly,
Cj.) (noting that rule of specialty in extradition "partakes of both" domestic and international
law, and applying it under Sabbatino as "a rule of what we would now call United States foreign
relations law devised by the courts to implement the [extradition] treaty").
70 See, e.g., United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 540-41 (D.N.J. 1978) (construing the con-
gressional intent underlying the term "goods or chattels" of a diplomat by reference to sources of
customary international law).
71 See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 507 F Supp. 1177, 1188 n.9 (D. Conn. ig8o) (Cabranes, J.), aff d
in part, 65i F.2d 96 (2d Cir. i98i) (considering U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners as "expressions of the obligations ... of the member states of the United Nations, and
as part of the body of international law (including customary international law) concerning hu-
man rights") (citation omitted).
72 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-98 (D. Kan. xg8o), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (ioth Cir. i98i).
73 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 6i1, 623
(1983). Similarly, in the submerged land cases, the Court construed federal legislation respecting
ownership of submerged lands in light of complementary rules in treaties regarding the territorial
sea and the customary international law of the sea. See cases cited supra note 64.
75 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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in light of the federal common law principle of comity, while four oth-
ers construed the statute in light of customary international law.7 6
If all of these rules are federal (as the prevailing view suggests),
then the uniquely federal area of foreign relations operates on an en-
tirely federal plane, with statutes and treaties providing the positive
law framework and federal common law rules (interpreting statutes,
treaties, and customary international law) filling the interstices. As
Congress and the executive branch exercise their supervisory powers,
federal common law doctrine evolves and mutates to reflect the
changing face of international law.
Take, for example, the federal doctrine of foreign sovereign immu-
nity, which originated in the customary international law doctrine of
absolute foreign sovereign immunity. Over time, the Supreme Court
incorporated that decision into United States law and melded it with a
federal common law doctrine of judicial deference to federal executive
suggestions of immunity.77 Eventually, executive policy brought U.S.
practice into line with the emerging customary international law doc-
trine of restrictive sovereign immunity,78 and Congress codified the
new doctrine in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),79 whose
gaps federal courts have subsequently filled by declaring rules of fed-
eral common law.80 In short, rules that originate in customary interna-
76 Compare id. at 794-99 (Souter, J., concurring) (analyzing the issue as governed by the fed-
eral common law principle of comity), with id. at 812-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that ju-
risdictional reach of the antitrust statute should instead have been construed in light of customary
international law).
77 See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (declaring the rule
of absolute foreign sovereign immunity). For cases illustrating the doctrine of executive sugges-
tion, see, for example, Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (i945); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S.
578 (3943); and Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 27, U.S. 562 (X926). For a description of the
evolution of the U.S. law of foreign sovereign immunity, see generally HENRY J. STEINER,
DETLEV F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 753-819 (4th
ed. x994).
78 See Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Govern-
ments ("Tate Letter"), May ig, 1952, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 23, 1952, at 984, 985 (concluding,
after an extensive survey of foreign State practice, that "the widespread and increasing practice
on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary" a shift to an
executive policy of restrictive foreign sovereign immunity).
79 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (i994). The FSIA, in turn, became but one piece of a world-
wide movement to codify the law of restrictive foreign sovereign immunity through national leg-
islation that soon included state immunity acts in the United Kingdom, Singapore, South Africa,
Pakistan, Canada, and Australia, among others countries. See generally U.N. MATERIALS ON
THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/2o, U.N. Sales No. E/F.i.V.o (1982) (including national legislation from numer-
ous countries). These national statutes inspired a multilateral codification movement, now led by
the International Law Commission's Draft Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property. See generally Virginia Morris, The International Law Commission's Draft Con-
vention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 17 DENv. J. IT'L L. &
POL'Y 395 (i989) (discussing the draft convention).
80 See, e.g., Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425-26 (9 th Cir. 1989); Harris v . Poiskie
Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d ooo, 1003-04 (9th Cir. r987) (applying federal common law to create a
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tional law are regularly determined by United States courts and incor-
porated into federal common law, then updated by executive policy as
customary law evolves, and codified in federal statutes whose intersti-
ces are filled through federal common lawmaking.
Bradley and Goldsmith would disrupt this dynamic framework by
creating two rigid tiers of international law within the United States
legal system: a federal tier for ratified treaties, and a state tier for what
they deem to be lesser, non-positive customary law."' Under their sce-
nario, a treaty that is not ratified, but that nevertheless announces im-
portant customary international law rules - for example, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties8 2 or the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea83 - need not be applied or respected by
state courts or legislatures unless expressly executed by a statute or or-
der emanating from the federal political branches.8 4  Under this rea-
soning, the fifty states of the Union had no domestic legal obligation to
obey customary norms against genocide during the period from De-
cember 1948, when the United States first signed the Genocide Con-
vention, until November 1988, when the United States finally ratified
that treaty and executed it as domestic federal law.85
FSIA choice of law rule); Mashayekhi v. Iran, 515 F. Supp. 41, 43 (D.D.C. x981) (applying federal
common law to construe the immunity provisions of a bilateral treaty in light of FSIA).
81 Indeed, one might read Bradley and Goldsmith as creating yet a third, subordinate custom-
ary international law tier, whose rules state courts and legislatures may selectively incorporate, or
refuse to incorporate, at their discretion. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra
note 15, at 349-50.
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of reaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, S. ExEc.
Doc. L, 92-I (1971); see also I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 145 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] ("This Restatement accepts
the Vienna Convention as, in general, constituting a codification of the customary international
law governing international agreements, and therefore as foreign relations law of the United
States even though the United States has not adhered to the Convention.").
83 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 1261. Although the United States objected to the deep seabed mining provisions of the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, it accepted large parts as customary international law.
See United States Oceans Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMp. PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar. 24, 1983). At this
writing, 12o nations have ratified the 1982 Convention, and the United States has finally declared
its intent to seek formal ratification. See Testimony February r, z998 Madeleine K. Albright
Secretary Department of State Senate Foreign Relations FY99 Foreign Policy Budget Request,
FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARINGHOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, Feb. xo, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
84 Thus, rather than adopting the prevailing view of presumptive incorporation through judi-
cial action, Bradley and Goldsmith would adopt the opposite rule of presumptive ouster absent
express political incorporation. As Professor Lessig notes, under Bradley and Goldsmith's highly
formal, "strictly positivistic view, the only law is domestic law, and the only domestic law is stat-
ute or constitution based; so before international law gets incorporated into a domestic regime, a
statute must ratify it." Lessig, supra note 17, at i8io.
85 See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. xoo-6o6, 102 Stat. 3045
(codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (1994)) (implementing the Genocide Convention on Nov. 5,
1988); Recent Actions Regarding Ieaties to Which the United States is a Party, 28 I.LM. 786
(1989) (giving notice that the United States deposited notice of ratification on Nov. 25, 1988).
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Were Bradley and Goldsmith's position the law, we would expect
to see proliferation of varying state rules of customary international
law, or even the total exclusion of such norms from state law. Yet the
Constitution created the institutions of federal government precisely to
avoid such balkanization of foreign policy and international affairs. In
The Federalist No. 8o, Alexander Hamilton expressed concern that the
United States might be held internationally responsible for "an unjust
sentence against a foreigner" issued by a state court.8 6 As founders of
a fledgling nation broadly subject to the law of nations, the Framers
feared that a state court's denial of international justice might inspire
the alien's nation to make war on the United States. 7 To avoid that
scenario, Hamilton outlined a distinction "between cases arising upon
treaties and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely 9P
the footing of the municipal law."88 "The former kind," he suggested,
"may be supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that
of the [s]tates."8 9
History and doctrine thus suggest that the so-called "modern posi-
tion" extends at least as far back as Alexander Hamilton. Far from
being novel, the "modern position" is actually a long-accepted, tradi-
tional reading of the federal courts' function. Both before and after
Erie, the federal courts issued rulings construing the law of nations.
Erie never intended to alter or disrupt that practice, which has contin-
ued as the "new" federal common law. The Supreme Court and the
lower courts endorsed this view of Erie in Sabbatino and in myriad
subsequent decisions. The only question, then, is whether counter-
vailing constitutional concerns regarding separation of powers, feder-
alism, or "democracy" should now force reconsideration of what should
correctly be termed the "traditional position."
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS
If customary international law is federal law, Bradley and Gold-
smith suggest, "judicial enforcement would seem to raise special sepa-
86 THE FEDERALIST No. 8o, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In the
famous Marbois Incident of 1784, an alien who assaulted a foreign diplomat was tried criminally
in a state court, demonstrating the vulnerability of the federal government when international law
claims are heard before state judges. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over Interna-
tional Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, i8 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. i, 24-28
(x985) (discussing the Marbois Incident).
87 See THE FEDERALIST No. 8o, supra note 4, at 476-77 (Alexander Hamilton) C'[I]t is at least
problematical whether an unjust sentence against a foreigner ... would not, if unredressed, be an
aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations in a treaty or the
general law of nations."); cf Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813-14 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (acknowledging a class of federal common law torts that constituted
"the kinds of offenses for which Congress wished to provide tort jurisdiction for suits by aliens in
order to avoid conflicts with other nations") (emphasis added).
88 THE FEDERALiST No. 80, supra note 4, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
89 Id.
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ration-of-powers concerns, since the President needs flexibility in rep-
resenting the United States on the international plane and plays a cen-
tral role in representing the U.S. position concerning the content of
[customary international law]."90 But if these separation of powers
concerns are serious, they must be of very recent vintage. The cen-
tury-old case of The Paquete Habana9' is but one example of a routine
Supreme Court decision that enforced a rule of customary interna-
tional law against an executive official, without a trace of separation of
powers concerns.
92
Sabbatino repeatedly emphasized the "proper distribution of func-
tions between the judicial and political branches of the [federal] Gov-
ernment on matters bearing upon foreign affairs."93  But in the next
breath, Sabbatino also cautioned that "[t]his decision in no way inti-
mates that the courts of this country are broadly foreclosed from con-
sidering questions of international law.194 "[T]he greater the degree of
codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international
law," the Court declared, "the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it. . .. "9,5
Thus, when customary international norms are well-defined, the
executive branch has regularly urged the federal courts to determine
such rules as matters of federal law.96 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,97 the
target of much of Bradley and Goldsmith's critique, the Justice and
State Departments together urged the Second Circuit to construe the
90 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note i5, at 352.
91 175 U.S. 677 (9oo).
92 In The Paquete Habana, the United States Navy condemned as prize of war fishing vessels
owned by Spanish citizens. See id. at 678-79. The owners sought recovery of the vessels, assert-
ing that customary international law barred the seizure of private fishing vessels as prize. See id.
After reviewing customary international law, the Court accepted the owners' interpretation and
ordered that they be paid the proceeds from the sale of those vessels. See Scott W. Stucky, The
Paquete Habana: A Case History in the Development of International Law, IS U. BALT. L. REv.
1, 14-32 (985).
93 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964).
94 Id. at 43o n.34.
95 Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
96 See, e.g., 11 1988 DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE, supra note 25, at I581 (quoting Statement of
Interest of the United States (Mar. 21, i988), in Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 734 F. Supp.
415 (C.D. Cal. I9go) (No. CV 86-2255-RSWL) (urging the district court to determine the immu-
nity of a government official "in accordance with the general principles of sovereign immunity,
rather than in accordance with the FSIA")); I r988 DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE, supra note 25, at
3439 (quoting Memorandum prepared by U.S. Department of State Office of Legal Adviser (Mar.
29, 1988), in United States v. Shakur, 690 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Nos. 84 Cr. 22o-CSH,
SSS 82 Cr. 312-CSH) (urging district court to find, in accordance with customary international
law, that the criminal defendant is not a prisoner of war)); Neuman, supra note 17, at 377 (dis-
cussing the Nixon Administration's amicus brief urging enforcement of the customary interna-
tional law rule of consular tax immunity in Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 25o N.E.2d
698 (N.Y. 1969)).
97 63o F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 198o).
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international law norms involved under the ATCA.98 The Administra-
tion explicitly rejected Bradley and Goldsmith's view, citing Sabbatino
and The Paquete Habana for the proposition that "[c]ustomary interna-
tional law is federal law, to be enunciated authoritatively by the federal
courts." 9 9
More recently, in Kadic v. Karadzic,100 the Solicitor General and
the Legal Adviser of the State Department urged the Second Circuit to
vacate and remand the jurisdictional dismissal of an ATCA suit
against Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.' 0 ' Far from rejecting
what Bradley and Goldsmith call "the open-ended Filartiga approach
to the judicial incorporation of CIL into federal law," 0 2 the Solicitor
General called Filartiga "the starting point for the necessary analysis,"
that is, "a rigorous analysis of a range of factors in order to determine
whether an action can be pursued under the Alien Tort Statute for a
violation of the law of nations."' 0 3 Rather than declaring modern hu-
man rights litigation to be "illegitimate," based on the so-called "new"
customary international law, the executive branch expressly acknowl-
edged the court's duty to conduct such litigation by "looking to mod-
ern conceptions of customary international law."'1 4 In short, nothing
in the executive branch's approach to recent human rights cases sug-
gests that federal common law rules of customary international law
unconstitutionally intrude upon executive prerogative.
Nor do Bradley and Goldsmith explain how treating customary in-
ternational law as federal common law unconstitutionally invades the
legislative prerogative. As noted above, Article I, Section 8, Clause io
of the Constitution grants Congress express authority to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations, a power that it has exer-
cised over the.years by enacting a broad range of statutes. 05 Much of
98 "[S]uch suits unquestionably implicate foreign policy considerations. But not every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Like many other ar-
eas affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental human rights is not committed
exclusively to the political branches of government" Memorandum for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 63o F.2d 876 (2d Cir. i98o) (No. 79-6o9o), reprinted in i9
I.L.M. 585, 603 (i98o) (citations omitted).
99 Id. at 6o6 n.49 (ig8o) (emphasis added).
100 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. z995).
101 See Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995) (Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069).
102 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note i5, at 366.
103 Brief of United States at 2, Kadic (NOs. 94-9035, 94-9069). The executive branch suggested
that, as long as courts engage in such a rigorous analysis, separation of powers concerns need not
arise. See id. at i (finding "no merit to the suggestion ... that the justiciability of these cases is in
doubt because of the [political question doctrine or] the theoretical possibility that Karadzic might
some day be recognized by the Executive Branch as a head of state").
104 Id. at 2.
lOS See statutes cited supra note 6o. For more recent statutes, see, for example, War Crimes
Act, i8 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (Supp. 1997); Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
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the federal courts' lawmaking in the human rights area represents
statutory gap-filling; particularly with respect to statutes such as the
ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).106 In Filartiga
and its progeny, numerous federal courts construed the ATCA to per-
mit aliens to sue foreign officials for acts of torture, summary execu-
tion, disappearance, and similar universal crimes committed under
color of state law.10 7 After extensive lobbying by human rights groups,
in 1992 Congress finally passed the TVPA, which was designed spe-
cifically to supplement and complement, not to narrow, the preexisting
scope of the ATCA. 1 8 The TVPA codified and extended to citizen
plaintiffs statutory causes of action for torture and summary execution
suffered under the actual or apparent authority, or under color of law,
of any foreign nation.'0 9 The TVPA's legislative history expressly de-
clared that "[i]nternational human rights cases predictably raise legal
issues - such as interpretations of international law - that are mat-
ters of Federal common law and within the particular expertise of Fed-
eral courts."110
Bradley and Goldsmith cite no contrary evidence to suggest that
Congress viewed such federal common lawmaking as unconstitution-
ally infringing upon its legislative prerogatives. To the contrary, their
initial article conceded that Congress not only has constitutional power
to legislate human rights norms into federal law, but "did precisely this
with respect to torture cases when it enacted the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act.""' But in their most recent writing, they reverse course,
now reading the TVPA to reflect "a broader and unambiguous pattern
99-44o, ioo Stat. 1o86; and Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-399, 1oo Stat. 875.
106 See Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, lo6 Stat. 73 (1992); supra note 33.
107 See supra note 65.
108 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT, H. R.
REP. No. 102-367, pt- i, at 3, 4 (iggi), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86. The Report states:
Section 1350 [the ATCA] has other important uses and should not be replaced.... [C]laims
based on torture or summary executions do'not exhaust the list of actions that may appro-
priately be covered [by] section 135o. That statute should remain intact to permit suits
based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary
international law.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 14Z7 Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l Orgs. of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, iooth Cong.
1 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Yatron, chairman of subcommittee) ('It is not the intent of the Congress
to weaken [the Alien Tort Claims Act], but to strengthen and clarify it.").
109 Numerous groups, including the American Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, testified before the House,
seeking to ensure that enactment of the TVPA would not be interpreted as undercutting the le-
gitimacy of human rights litigation under the ATCA. See Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearings
on H.R. 1417 Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l Orgs. of the House Comm. on For-
eign Affairs, xooth Cong. 1, 7 1-72 (1988).
110 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 6 n.6 (1991) (emphasis added).
In1 Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 11, at 873.
1844 [VOL 111:1824
HeinOnline -- 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1844 1997-1998
IS INTERNATIONAL LAW REALLY STATE LAW?
of political branch resistance to open-ended incorporation of interna-
tional human rights norms" into federal law.12
In fact, Bradley and Goldsmith's latest position offends legislative
prerogatives. After demanding explicit political branch authorization
as a precondition to incorporating international law norms, the authors
construe two duly enacted statutes in a way that all but negates the
political act of incorporation. In the name of judicial restraint, and
without any specific evidence of congressional intent, they -read the
TVPA - the later, complementary statute - to repeal de facto the
ATCA - the earlier, broader statute - with respect to all claims other
than torture and summary execution (the two causes of action ex-
pressly created by the TVPA). 1 3 Not only do the authors provide no
statutory evidence for such an implicit repealer," 4 they rely on specu-
lation about the atmosphere surrounding the legislative process to
support their narrow reading of the TVPA."5
As Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have recently demonstrated,
Congress designed the TVPA to do far more than this minimal task." 6
In enacting this statute, Congress expressly intended both to codify
and to extend to citizens the Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga."
7
In so doing, Congress both recognized and approved the federal
courts' traditional authority under federal common law to determine
whether particular rules have ripened into customary international
law." 8
Ironically, Bradley and Goldsmith's approach creates, rather than
alleviates, separation of powers concerns. For after demanding that
the political branches enact statutes that domesticate international
human rights norms, the authors endorse a judicial approach that
112 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 15, at 367 (emphasis added).
113 See id. at 366 ("Congress in the TVPA federalized only prohibitions on torture and extraju-
dicial killing. Moreover, the TVPA appears in fact to limit the Filartiga approach with respect to
these two central and important international law prohibitions.").
114 The Rehnquist Court has repeatedly emphasized the presumption against repeals by impli-
cation. See, e.g., Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R_ Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S.
490, 52o (1989); Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 551 (1988); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1987).
1S See Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 15, at 367 (noting the "years of
debate, compromise, and precise drafting" that went into the statute, and concluding that "[lit is
extremely unlikely that the members of Congress who demanded [many legislative] changes and
ultimately voted for the TVPA would have assented to the much broader, open-ended, and unde-
fined Filartiga approach.").
116 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 17, at 513-28.
117 See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The TVPA codifies the
holding in Filartiga .... "); 137 CONG. REC. S1378, S1378 (daily ed. iggi) (remarks of Sen. Spec-
ter, principal Senate sponsor) ("This bill would extend protection to U.S. citizens while retaining
the current law's protection of aliens.").
118 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, TORTURE VIcTIm PROTECTION AcT, H.R. REP.
No. 102-367, pt. i, at 4 (iggi), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (explaining that the ATCA
"should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the
future into rules of customary international law" (emphasis added)).
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would read most of two such statutes off the books. They read an act
of Congress specifically denominated for the protection of torture vic-
tims as mere lip service toward that end. In the face of express, con-
trary legislative history, they urge judges to use the political "back-
ground against which the legislative history of the TVPA must be
read" to eviscerate the statute. 119 If this is a plea against judicial ac-
tivism, it is a very curious one indeed.
IV. FEDERALISM
Bradley and Goldsmith's plea for states' rights strikes an even
stranger chord. They argue that the traditional exercise of federal
common lawmaking power with regard to customary international
rules "portends a dramatic transfer of constitutional authority from the
states to the world community and to the federal judiciary.''120 But
surely, that transfer of authority did not take place recently, at the be-
hest of a few academics, but at the beginning of the Republic,121 from
the dictates of the Supreme Court, Congress, and the federal executive
branch, the primary beneficiary of this trend.
The trend toward federal supremacy in foreign affairs established
at the founding accelerated with the Chinese immigration cases of the
late nineteenth century. These cases declared Congress's power to con-
trol immigration to be exclusive and inherent in the sovereignty of the
United States. 122 Numerous subsequent decisions confirmed the broad
range of Congress's exclusive powers under the Foreign Commerce
Clause. 12
3
Then, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,124 the Court
suggested that the federal power over foreign affairs never derived
from the states. Instead, Justice Sutherland's opinion asserted, that
power vested directly "in the federal government as necessary con-
119 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 15, at 367.
120 Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note II, at 846.
121 As Professor Henkin notes, "[bly virtue of independence and statehood, international law
became binding on the United States, not on the individual states." Henkin, supra note 31, at
z556-57; see Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered. A Historical Refutation
of State Sovereignty over Seabeds, 74 COLum. L. REv. 1056, 1074-83 (r974).
122 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi-
nese Exclusion and Its Progeny, ioo HARV. L. REV. 853, 853-63 (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky,
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255,
266-67, 288-89 (1985); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration,
Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 925-26 (I995).
123 See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddelston, 507 U.S. 6o, 71-78 (1993); Wardair Can-
ada Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. i, 7-13 (1986); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (i979) ("In international relations and with respect to foreign inter-
course and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and
adequate national power." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
124 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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comitants of nationality,"125 to be exercised by the President "as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions."126 The following Term, in United States v. Belmont, 27 Justice
Sutherland made clear that in the foreign affairs realm, claims of
states' rights carry little weight 2 8 "[Iln respect of our foreign rela-
tions generally," Justice Sutherland wrote, "state lines disappear. As to
such purposes the state of New York does not exist."1 29 Amid this his-
torical background, Sabbatino provides the judicial piece of the federal
supremacy picture. The decision acknowledged the supremacy of not
only Congress and the President, but also federal judges' making
common law rules in the area of external relations. The Sabbatino
Court found such federal common lawmaking to be justified by ex-
plicit constitutional grants and the need to maintain national uniform-
ity in areas of uniquely federal interest.
130
Bradley and Goldsmith challenge this orthodoxy with a peripheral
attack on the doctrine of "dormant foreign relations preemption,"' 3' as
exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v. Miller.'
32
In Zschernig, the Court invalidated an Oregon "Iron Curtain" statute
as an unconstitutional "intrusion by the [s]tate into the field of foreign
affairs."1 33 Justice Stewart's concurrence made clear that the case fell
squarely under Sabbatino's rationale. "[T]he conduct of our foreign
affairs," he wrote, "is entrusted under the Constitution to the National
Government, not to the probate courts of the several States."
34
Zschernig has been appropriately criticized for its failure to deline-
ate clearly when a state's decision has such broad international reper-
cussions that it should be deemed specifically preempted. 35 In the
modern era, situations increasingly arise in which state and national
governments exercise overlapping authority, the federal government
125 Id. at318.
126 Id. at 320. For criticism of the decision, see, for example, KOH, cited above in note S9, at
page 94.
127 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
128 See id. at 331.
129 Id. at 331; see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) We repeat that there are
limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to
its own domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in
the national government exclusively.").
130 See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
131 Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 862-70.
132 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
133 Id. at 432. The Zschernig Court invalidated the Oregon escheat statute, which the Oregon
courts had applied to deny inheritance to an East German resident. The Supreme Court struck
down the law after examining the ways in which the statute required the local probate court to
inquire into the makeup of foreign governments, the administration of foreign law, the veracity of
diplomatic statements, and the right to receive funds. See id. at 436.
134 Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
135 See, e.g., HENKiN, supra note 46, at 163, 436 n.64; Harold Maier, Preemption of State Law:
A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 836 (x989).
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has arguably condoned state action inconsistent with customary norms
of international law, or customary international law and state law rules
are insufficiently contradictory for a court to give the former preemp-
tive force.1
36
Bradley and Goldsmith, however, make two broader claims. First,
they suggest that the federal courts' application of customary interna-
tional law to states "without the filter of constitutional or legislative
authorization" is "inconsistent with the Supreme Court's modern fed-
eralism jurisprudence."1 37 But surely nothing in that jurisprudence
speaks to "restoring" to the states external foreign affairs powers that
were not reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, and several of
which - like the treaty, compact, and agreement powers - were spe-
cifically removed from the states by other constitutional provisions. 38
Second, the authors claim that the Court's recent decision in Bar-
clays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board'39 demonstrates that the Su-
preme Court is "back[ing] away" from Zschernig's recognition of fed-
eral supremacy in foreign affairs. 140 In Barclays Bank, after several
false starts, 141 the Court finally upheld California's worldwide com-
bined reporting method for taxing multinational corporations. Noting
the wave of foreign protests urging the opposite result, Bradley and
Goldsmith optimistically read this decision to hold that all state pro-
nouncements on foreign affairs are presumptively valid, until expressly
preempted by a validly enacted federal law.
But the salient fact about Barclays Bank, which Bradley and Gold-
smith simply miss, is that the Solicitor General supported California's
claim "that the taxes at issue in these cases violated no federal policy
and therefore were not unlawfully collected."'142 Thus, the case reveals
less about the Supreme Court's view of federalism than about the
Court's traditional judicial deference to the executive branch in foreign
affairs. 4 3 As the then-Solicitor General put it:
136 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of Interna-
tional Law, I994 Sup. CT. REV. 295, 336 (1995) (describing such cases and arguing that there "is a
strong but rebuttable presumption that state violations of international law should be invali-
dated").
137 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 15, at 345.
138 See supra note S.
139 512 U.S. 298 (I994).
140 Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note iI, at 865.
141 See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 338-41 (iggo) (finding a
constitutional challenge to the California franchise tax barred by the Tax Injunction Act); Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 417 N.E.2d 1343 (Ill. Ig8i), appeal dismissed, 463
U.S. 1220 (1983); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 193-97 (1983).
142 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 28, Barclays Bank (No. 92-1384). The Bush
Administration had previously supported the challenge to the state statute, but the Clinton Ad-
ministration reversed that position (although not on the issue of the impact of congressional si-
lence). See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at328 n.30.
143 For a discussion of the sources of this deference, see KoH, cited above in note 59, at pages
134-49.
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[I]n the absence of a dispositive statute or treaty, the courts must respect
the judgments of the President regarding matters of foreign policy both
where the President has determined that state compliance with an interna-
tional norm is essential and where he has determined that foreign gov-
ernments should not be allowed to dictate the practices of the States.
144
Given that neither Congress nor the President asserted that Cali-
fornia's taxation policy violated a clear federal policy, the Court de-
clared, "we cannot conclude that 'the foreign policy of the United
States - whose nuances ... are much more the province of the Ex-
ecutive Branch and Congress than of this Court - is [so] seriously
threatened' by California's practice as to warrant our intervention."
145
Only the most wishful thinkers could read this language as some kind
of ringing affirmation of states' rights to remake or reject customary
international law at will.1
46
One need not denigrate the ability or impartiality of state court
judges to recognize that the federal judges have structural attributes
that make them more appropriate adjudicators to rule on international
matters that may embroil the nation in foreign policy disputes. Unlike
state judges, who are effectively unaccountable to national institutions
on matters of pure state law,147 federal judges are nominated by a na-
tional official (the President), are confirmed by a national body (the
Senate), are granted salary independence and life tenure, and render
federal common law rulings subject to review and revision by federal
appellate courts, Congress, and the executive branch.14 8
144 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Barclays Bank (No. 92-1384).
145 Barclays Bank, 52 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. '59, 196 (1983)).
146 In my view, the Court could have found a more persuasive basis for the Barclays Bank
holding. The Court could have ruled that the federal government had condoned the California
state action, and that no clear federal rule barring the worldwide combined reporting method of
taxation had ripened under either customary international law or any treaty or statute of the
United States. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Customary International Law and State Taxation of
Corporate Income: The Case for the Separate Accounting Method, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 99,
135 (1996) (recounting "substantial evidence" that a separate accounting, as opposed to a unitary
tax, method of accounting is a rule of customary international law, but conceding that "some evi-
dence ... suggests the United States may be a 'persistent objector' to, and therefore exempt from,
this rule"). Therefore, the Court was not obliged to treat the rule of separate accounting as a
principle of federal law with preemptive force over California law.
147 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (declaring that neither Congress nor
the federal courts has power to declare or review substantive rules of common law applicable in a
state).
148 As Professor Hazard notes:
- Federal judges have life tenure, while most state judges do not ....
- Federal judges are appointed by the President of the United States, and confirmed by
the United States Senate, and have a commission to prove it, status characteristics that
state judges do not have ....
_ Federal judges are elected by a multi-filter, relatively visible, ultimately high level ap-
pointive process, a basis of investiture not enjoyed by most state judges, who are chosen
through low visibility nomination and nearly invisible election, except where their selection
is by political election ....
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The Framers decided to commit final resolution of constitutional
cases to federal judges because they deemed such judges to be "free of
the political webs connecting Congress, state legislatures, state courts,
and temporary parochial majorities." 149 Yet oddly, on matters of in-
ternational law that implicate parallel federal interests,' 50 Bradley and
Goldsmith would give state judges the last word. "In a case in which
no clear state law is on point, as will usually be the case in view of the
paucity of state court interpretations of CIL," they argue, "a federal
court sitting in diversity would be required to predict how the highest
state court would rule regarding CIL's status."'-' The import of this
bizarre suggestion is that, before the U.S. ratification of the Genocide
Convention, a federal judge, faced with the question whether to apply
the rules against genocide in a civil tort suit, would have to predict
whether the Supreme Court of Tennessee, for example, would incorpo-
rate the universal norm against genocide into Tennessee law. Or fed-
eral judges sitting in New York diversity actions filed against Imelda
Marcos, Lee Teng-hui, Benjamin Netanyahu, Yasser Arafat, or Pope
John Paul TI would have to guess whether the New York Court of Ap-
peals would accord each or all of these defendants head-of-state im-
munity.5 2
Even those who favor broader federal executive discretion in for-
eign affairs cannot support the Bradley and Goldsmith thesis. For if
their position were the law, how would the President's lawyers advise
a visiting head of state about her chances of civil immunity while trav-
eling on a classic State visit from Hawaii, to Williamsburg, Virginia, to
Washington, D.C., and to New York (and the U.N. headquarters dis-
trict)?15 3 Nor does the Bradley and Goldsmith rule help multinational
- Federal judges are part of the United States Government, ... an entire institutional
matrix that is a creature of legal rules.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on the Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 642, 647
(1985).
149 Amar, supra note 30, at 700.
150 Cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 8o4-o5 n.u (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) ("A state-court suit that involved a determination of international law would require
consideration of... the principle that foreign relations are constitutionally relegated to the federal
government and not the states.").
151 Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note xi, at 870 n.345.
1S2 To paraphrase Justice Rutledge's dissent in Guaranty Tust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), if
we take states' rights concerns too far in this context, "[t]he next step may well be to say that.., a
federal court must surrender its own judgment and attempt to find out what a state court sitting a
block away would do." Id. at iig (Rutledge, J., dissenting); cf Paul A. Freund, ChiefJustice
Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1210, 1212 (1946) (recalling "that spacious era
before the Erie case, when federal judges in diversity cases were more than echoes of half-heard
whispers of the state tribunals").
153 It is unclear how such a result would promote the presidential "flexibility" in international
affairs so emphasized in Bradley and Goldsmith's separation of powers argument. See supra pp.
1841-42. Indeed it was to forestall such results that the Sabbatino Court wrote:
Whatever considerations are thought to predominate, it is plain that the problems involved
are uniquely federal in nature. If federal authority, in this instance this Court, orders the
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national corporations, which must make their business plans based
upon the uniformity, predictability, and reliability of judge-made rules.
How would a foreign transnational corporation doing business in fifty
different states of the Union know, for example, what standard or
valuation of compensation it would likely receive if its action for inter-
ference with property rights were heard in one state court rather than
another?1
54
Bradley and Goldsmith reply that "[i]n fact, states rarely consider
issues of CIL, and when they do, they tend to adopt a very deferential
attitude toward the federal government's views."15 Yet the claimed
urgency of their proposal rests on their prediction that an explosion of
"new CIL" will increasingly call upon state courts to make determina-
tions in this area. If, as they say, state courts "tend to adopt" the fed-
eral government's views, 56 the obvious explanation is that state
judges feel bound to follow federal interpretations of customary inter-
national law! Significantly, Bradley and Goldsmith cite no examples
in which the states have complained about a federal court ruling on
international law "invading" their sovereignty. This silence strongly
suggests that the states do not need or want (or never understood that
they had) the power to determine conclusively international law for the
United States. 5
7
field of judicial competence in this area for the federal courts, and the state courts are left
free to formulate their own rules, the purposes behind the doctrine could be as effectively
undermined as if there had been no federal pronouncement on the subject.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 434 (964).
154 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981), the Sec-
ond Circuit held under "principles of international, not merely local, law" that an American bank
nationalized in Cuba deserved full compensation for its loss, excluding an award of damages for
future earnings. Id. at 888, 892-93. Were this rule not binding on the states as federal law, and if
no treaty controlled on the matter, a foreign corporation such as Sony or Royal Dutch Shell would
have little certainty regarding whether and to what extent it might be entitled to compensation for
a state's interference with its property rights in violation of international law. It was to ensure
reciprocal certainty for American corporations that the federal courts have declared, pursuant to
the act of state doctrine, a federal common law rule limiting the extraterritorial reach of a foreign
government's act of expropriation. Cf Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50
(2d Cir. io65) ("It would be baffling if a foreign act of state intended to affect property in the
United States were ignored on one side of the Hudson but respected on the other; any such diver-
sity between states would needlessly complicate the handling of the foreign relations of the United
States.").
155 Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ri, at 871 (footnote omit-
ted).
is6 Id. at 871.
1S7 By so saying, I am not denying the authority of state courts to construe their own state laws
in light of customary international law. See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131 (Or. 1981)
(construing the Oregon Constitution in light of U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners); Peters v. McKay, 238 P.2d 225, 239 (Or. 95i). When the appropriate federal court
has issued a definitive ruling regarding a customary international law rule, however, that ruling
would bind state courts like any other federal common law ruling, subject to congressional revi-
sion.
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If the authors' prediction is wrong, and some state judges refuse to
"adopt a very deferential attitude toward the federal government's
views"158 on the law of treaties, arbitrary detention, or extraterritorial
exercises of domestic law, what recourse would the federal government
have? Bradley and Goldsmith would likely say, "Congress and the
President could pass a statute." But how, realistically, can federal leg-
islators hope to police and correct all erroneous rulings of customary
international law in fifty different states? 159
In the end, the question thus becomes: what interests could possibly
justify creating an unprecedented new state role in the making, inter-
pretation, and incorporation of international law norms? Here, Brad-
ley and Goldsmith play their final card: "democracy."
V. DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGITIMACY OF CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
At bottom, Bradley and Goldsmith's complaint reduces to this:
"unelected federal judges apply customary international law made by
the world community at the expense of state prerogatives. In this con-
text, of course, the interests of the states are neither formally nor effec-
tively represented in the lawmaking process.'
160
Again, one might well ask, "So what else is new?" As Professor
Neuman has noted, because federal courts have applied customary in-
ternational law since the beginning of the Republic, "one might think
it was rather late to claim that judicial application of customary inter-
national law was in principle inconsistent with the American under-
standing of democracy."161 Moreover, there is absolutely nothing new
about unelected judges applying law that was made elsewhere. That
is not an indictment but a description of the process of common law
judging.162  Every court in the United States - including the state
courts that Bradley and Goldsmith champion - applies law that was
not made by its own polity whenever the court's own choice-of-law
158 Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 871.
159 Cf. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, io5 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 8oo (x957). Mishkin
explains:
Beyond the political realities which will at times compel congressional by-passing of any
issue ... lie such simpler pressures as shortness of time and, perhaps most important, the
severe limits of human foresight. Together, these factors combine to make the concept of
statutory enactment as a totally self-sufficient and exclusive legislative process entirely un-
real.
Id.
160 Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 868 (emphasis
added).
161 Neuman, supra note 17, at 383.
162 See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 272
(1992).
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principles so direct. 163 Nor is there anything inherently undemocratic
about judges applying norms of customary law that were made outside
the United States. This, too, is something that American judges have
done since the beginning of the Republic, whenever they declared rules
of customary international law to be part of "general common law."
1 64
In its sixty-year jurisprudence of "new" federal common law, the Su-
preme Court has never treated the decisions of unelected federal
judges as constitutionally illegitimate, as long as the case involved
"'uniquely federal interests' [, which were] so committed by the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is
pre-empted and replaced ... by federal law of a content prescribed by
the courts."
16
When construing customary international law, federal courts ar-
guably exercise less judicial discretion than when making other kinds
of federal common law, as their task is not to create rules willy-nilly,
but rather to discern rules of decision from an existing corpus of cus-
tomary international law rules. 166 Here, Bradley and Goldsmith
charge that state interests are not formally or effectively represented in
the customary international lavmaking process. But insofar as cus-
tomary international law rules arise from traditional State practice, the
United States has been, for most of this century, the world's primary
163 See Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative Interna-
tional Law, 26 TEX. INT'L LJ. 87, 113 (1991). Significantly, Bradley and Goldsmith's proposal
would also allow unelected federal and state judges to construe customary international law, but
as some species of state law. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 383 ("Absent [s]tate legislative action,
the citizens in [s]tates with nonelected judiciaries would be entitled to complain against their
[s]tate judges that the judges were undemocratically imposing on them norms derived from a re-
mote international community.").
164 Neuman, supra note 17, at 389 ("State judges must have been behaving undemocratically
through all the years since 1776 when they were applying international law, whether as 'general
common law' or as anything else.").
16S Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (x88) (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 63o, 640 (ig8i)). For discussions of the legitimacy of federal common
lawmaking, see, for example, Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority
and Sources of Rules, 7o TEX. L. REV. 1551, 1571-87 (1992); and Kramer, cited above in note 162,
at page 288 note 84. As long as a predicate for uniform federal common law rules can be found in
the Constitution or acts of Congress, choosing judge-made federal law over state rules has clear
benefits. See Burbank, supra, at 158i (stating that if federal and state law are substantially dif-
ferent, "the costs of applying state law would more often include the possible loss of federal sub-
stantive rights and thus justify a conclusion that the federal substantive statute requires the appli-
cation of uniform federal ... law").
166 See Henkin, supra note 31, at 1561-62 (M.In a real sense federal courtsfind international law
rather than make it, ... as is clearly not the case when federal judges make federal common law
pursuant to constitutional or legislative delegation."); Koh, supra note 3o, at 2385-86 ("[A]s federal
courts have done over the centuries," in such cases, judges "determine whether a clear interna-
tional consensus has crystallized around a legal norm that protects or bestows rights upon a group
of individuals that includes plaintiffs."). In the modern human rights cases, for example, federal
courts have regularly demanded that the customary international law norm being invoked be uni-
versal, definable, and obligatory before allowing an actionable claim under the Alien Tort Claims
Act. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 17, at 495-97 (collecting decisions).
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maker of and participant in this practice. Increasingly, multilateral
treaty drafting processes and fora such as the United Nations, regional
fora, standing and ad hoc intergovernmental organizations, and dip-
lomatic conferences have become the driving forces in the creation and
shaping of contemporary international law.167 In nearly all of these
organizations and fora, the United States ranks among the leading par-
ticipants.
Notwithstanding the executive branch domination of foreign af-
fairs, in every foreign policy decisionmaking process, one can find mul-
tiple channels for congressional participation and state representation.
These include, but are not limited to, such oversight and input mecha-
nisms as hearings, markups, congressional consultations, committee
approval devices, and the like.168 When customary international law
rules arise from a treatymaking process, or from a treaty regime,
169
congressional interests are often directly represented at the negotiating
table. 70 Even.when Members of Congress are not allowed to partici-
pate directly in such treaty negotiations, the knowledge that any nego-
tiated agreement must return to Congress for ratification necessarily
pervades the executive branch's negotiating position.
171
Bradley and Goldsmith nowhere explain why explicit federal leg-
islation - a process notoriously dominated by committees, strong-
willed individuals, collective action problems, and private rent-
seeking 172 - is invariably more democratic than the judge-driven pro-
cess they criticize. 173 Nor do they explain why state courts would act
167 See Jonathan I. Charney, International Agreements and the Development of Customary In-
ternational Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 975-84 (1986) (discussing the modern role of these
agreement-making processes and fora for the development of customary international law); Jona-
than L Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 543 (I993).
168 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, x8
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 161-71 (1992) (rejecting a similar "democracy" objection and noting nu-
merous leverage points whereby congressional views may be factored into the executive decision).
169 See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 112-53 (i995) (describing
how this customary rule-making process unfolds).
170 See Koh, supra note I68, at 153 (noting that direct congressional participation in trade nego-
tiations has occurred since 1974). Such a direct congressional role has a long history. President
McKinley, for example, named three senators as members of the peace commission that negotiated
the end of the Spanish-American War. See KOH, supra note 59, at 91.
171 See generally Koh, supra note 168 (describing multiple channels for congressional input into
the trade negotiation process via the fast track legislative mechanism).
172 The literature on this subject, too, has killed several forests. See generally JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
LAW 200-01 (1997) (arguing that public choice theory is of limited value). For a discussion of in-
stitutional factors influencing congressional decisionmaking in foreign affairs, see KOH, cited
above in note 59, at pages 117-33.
173 Professor Kramer put it well:
[T]he fact [is] that large numbers of people are and always have been formally or practi-
cally disenfranchised. Indeed, public choice scholarship suggests that even our "represen-
tative" bodies are often wildly unrepresentative. Add to that the independent administra-
tive agencies that make so much law today, and the huge advantages that seem to flow
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more democratically than federal courts in deciding customary interna-
tional law cases. The Founders recognized that "democratic" values
are poorly served by permitting the courts of one state of the Union to
issue rulings that could potentially embroil the entire nation in interna-
tional controversies. 174 If, for example, a Massachusetts judge issued a
ruling on head-of-state immunity that triggered an international dis-
pute between the U.S. and the United Kingdom, the citizens of every
other state would potentially suffer from the unelected state judge's ac-
tions. Even under Bradley and Goldsmith's standards, it is hard to
imagine a more undemocratic result.
Under the traditional view, federal common law rules of customary
international law are perennially subject to a democratic check: super-
vision, revision, and endorsement by the federal political branches.
Take, for example, the federal common law rule of comity in interna-
tional antitrust cases. 17  This rule was first articulated as a principle
of general common law,176 which then-Professor Kingman Brewster
redefined in his international antitrust treatise as a so-called "jurisdic-
tional rule of reason." 177 In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Amer-
ica,17  the Ninth Circuit applied Brewster's analysis to permit U.S.
regulation of extraterritorial conduct through an interest-balancing
test, which other federal courts then applied as a judicial "brake" on
the extraterritorial exercise of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction. 17 9 In time,
the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
from incumbency and access to capital, and the clear contrast between "representative"
legislatures and "unrepresentative" judges begins to look rather murky. Unless we ignore
these flaws, the criticism made of [federal] common lawmaking can just as easily be leveled
at the process by which most law, including ordinary legislation, is made.
Kramer, supra note 162, at 272.
174 See supra pp. 184o-41.
175 See Harold Maier, International Comity and U.S. Federal Common Law, i9go PRoc. AM.
SOC. INT'L L. 326, 342 (iggi) ("If the federal common law process ... is accurately described as
the application of general principles to specific fact situations to arrive at legal results, then the
principle of comity is surely one of those general principles.").
176 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (i895) (defining comity as "the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws").
177 KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERiCAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958).
For a history of Brewster's role in developing the test later adopted in Timberlane, see Spencer
Weber Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad Today, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1251 (i995).
178 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
179 See id. at 6o8-i3 (linking interest-balancing to effects doctrine of United States v. Alcoa,
148 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. i945)); see also O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana,
S.A., 830 F.R2d 449, 451-53 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopting a variant of the Timberlane test); Montreal
Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869 (ioth Cir. ig8i) (same); In re Uranium Antitrust
Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir. i98o) (same); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (same). For examples from the securities context, see Con-
solidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989); Data Processing Equip.
Co. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 2972); and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1968).
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tions Law adapted Timberlane's interest-balancing test to aid determi-
nation of when a nation's exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is or is
not "reasonable," and the United States and foreign governments have
begun to follow suit.180
This story illustrates that federal common law rulemaking in inter-
national affairs is a critical element of the process of transnational le-
gai rulemaking, which I have elsewhere called "transnational legal
process."' 8 ' In this process, no bright line separates domestic rules of
decision (such as the act of state doctrine, which Bradley and Gold-
smith acknowledge is federal law) from the rules of customary interna-
tional law, which the authors would subject to state and political
branch supervision. International comity represents a principle with
roots in both common law and international law, which now may be
evolving into a rule of customary international law. 8 2  Whether
viewed as a rule of statutory construction or justiciability, or a princi-
ple of reasonableness, international comity clearly should be treated as
a doctrine of federal law, capable of revision by Congress, the execu-
tive branch, or the federal courts, as circumstances demand.18 3  But
180 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 82, § 403. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) test differs
from that in Timberlane in treating comity as an inherent limit on the prescriptive, legislative ju-
risdiction of Congress, not on the adjudicative jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Department
of Justice's i988 and 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations specifi-
cally contemplate the use of a comity-based balancing test to guide the extraterritorial prosecution
of U.S. antitrust laws. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTIcE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMnSSION,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDE LINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 3.1 (I995); U.S.
Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 55 ATRR
SPECIAL SUPP. 32 (Nov. 17, 1988); see also Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6(a) (1994) (applying U.S. antitrust law to certain foreign monopolistic conduct, without altering
courts' freedom to employ notions of comity). For a discussion of the growing convergence of
U.S. and European anti-competition laws, see, for example, Roger Alford, The Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust Laws: A Postscript on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA.
J. INT'L L. 1, 27-37 (1992).
181 Harold Hongju Koh, TRansnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. I8I, x81 (1996); see
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, io6 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997)
[hereinafter Koh, Why Nations Obey). For another example, see page 2839, discussing the evolu-
tion of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.
182 A substantial debate currently rages over whether comity, reasonableness, or interest-
balancing constitute rules of customary international law, as opposed to a national principle of
judicial deference. See David B. Massey, How the American Law Institute Influences Customary
Law: The Reasonableness Requirement of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J.
INT'L L. 419 (997); Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International
Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783 (1984).
183 The customary international law rule of "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation for
expropriation provides another illustration of evolution through transnational legal process. The
rule was first announced in an executive branch letter written by Cordell Hull in 1938 and had
not been sufficiently crystallized to be deemed a rule of customary international law in Sabbatino.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-30 (1964). But as the years went
on, the standard was embodied in bilateral investment treaties, executive branch statements, and
federal statutes, and was recognized by international judicial and arbitral tribunals. In x985 the
Second Circuit had come to recognize that standard as the controlling standard in an expropria-
tion case. See supra note 154 (discussing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658
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under Bradley and Goldsmith's reasoning, comity, like the act of state
doctrine, could be treated as federal common law only until it ripened
into a rule of "new" customary international law, at which point the
authors would relegate it to state supervision!
Nor is anything unusual, much less conspiratorial, about academ-
ics, federal courts, executive officials, Congress, and foreign govern-
ments' interacting in a variety of private and public, domestic and in-
ternational fora to make, interpret, internalize, and ultimately enforce
rules of transnational law. To the contrary, it is precisely through this
transnational legal process that interlinked rules of domestic and in-
ternational law develop, and that interlinked processes of domestic and
international compliance come about.'i 4
Bradley and Goldsmith view this traditionally fluid, accretive, os-
motic process of legal internalization - whereby some rules become
international law through treaty, others through custom, and others
remain rules of domestic law - as somehow threatening to state inter-
ests. Particularly claims of international human rights, they suggest,
so invade state prerogatives that such claims should be presumptively
barred from domestic law unless formally adopted by express political
branch authorization. Under this world view, the time-honored dia-
logic process, whereby jurists, publicists, and academic commentators
(such as the American Law Institute) seek - through writing, teach-
ing, and amicus briefs - to inform, influence, and improve judicial
decisionmaking, becomes a shady process of undue influence, "aca-
demic flats," and doctrinal bootstrapping.18 5 This view deems interna-
tional human rights litigation in U.S. courts illegitimate because the
traditional process of fashioning federal common law rules of custom-
ary international law "permits federal courts to accomplish through the
back door of CIL what the political branches have prohibited through
the front door of treaties.'
8 6
In my view, the law is not nearly so mechanistic and the world is
not nearly so sinister. Bradley and Goldsmith have stumbled into
what Professor Maier once described as the "power struggle image" of
state-federal conflict in foreign affairs: "a presently outmoded and ...
initially erroneous concept of the states and the national government
as competing sovereigns, vying for the right to control the national
F.2d 875 (2d Cir. ig8I)). For materials tracing the evolution of the compensation rule in expro-
priation cases, consult STEINER, VAGTs & KoH, cited above in note 77, at pages 45 1-505.
184 See Koh, Why Nations Obey, supra note iSi, at 2645-59 (illustrating how transnational le-
gal process promotes compliance).
185 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 874-76
(expressing concern about the influence of academics on judges in customary international law
cases).
186 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note I5, at 330-31.
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destiny."1 7 This zero-sum image of state-federal competition leads
Bradley and Goldsmith to downplay the multiple channels through
which international human rights norms trickle down to the states
from the federal government, and whereby states signal their concerns
about state prerogatives to the federal entities. 188 It also makes them
unduly suspicious of private actors, such as nongovernmental organi-
zations and activists, who play an increasingly important role in any
transnational legal process.'8 9 Like the police chief in Casablanca,
Bradley and Goldsmith cannot seriously be "shocked" to find courts
looking to academic writing for guidance in international law cases. 190
If anything, the influence of law and economics scholars over Ameri-
can antitrust law has been far more pervasive than the influence of in-
ternational law scholars on American international human rights ju-
risprudence, and through similar processes of intellectual influence. 191
And why should federal judges, who are protected by constitutional
guarantees of independence and sworn to uphold the laws of the
United States, be so easily misled by the law professors who write and
appear before them?
192
187 Harold G. Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private International
Matters, 5 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133, 163 (97).
188 This process is illustrated in the Barclays Bank case, discussed above in notes 139-146 and
accompanying text
189 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. (forthcoming Oct. 1998) (manuscript at 23-26, on file with author) (ex-
panding on the role of transnational norm entrepreneurs in transnational legal process); Koh, Why
Nations Obey, supra note 18r, at 2612 n.53 (discussing that role).
190 As Bradley and Goldsmith recognize, see Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International
Law, supra note ii, at 875 n. 361, for nearly 200 years, U.S. courts deciding international law
cases have looked to "the work of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research, and
experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subject of which they
treat." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (igoo). Article 38.1(d) of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1O55, xo6O, 3 Bevans 1153, i187, expressly de-
clares that "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations ... [are]
subsidiary means for the determination of [international] law." Id. at 1187; see also United States
v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 16o-6i (1820) ("What the law of nations on this subject is, may
be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the gen-
eral usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recogni[z]ing and enforcing that law.');
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 88o-81 (2d Cir. 1g8o). In Filartiga, the court declared: "The
Paquete Habana reaffirmed that ... the works of jurists and commentators ... are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be,
but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." Id.
191 Prominent antitrust scholars such as Robert Bork and Richard Posner have taken to the
bench, and others such as William Baxter and Donald Turner have worked in the Justice De-
partment. Still other academics, such as Phillip Areeda, have influenced the development of anti-
trust law largely through their writing and consulting.
192 For example, Bradley and Goldsmith's curious final footnote points to the fact that several
"proponents of the modern position," including me, have lectured to judges about international
human rights law over the past few years at the Aspen Institute. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Cus-
tomary International Law, supra note ii, at 876 n.365. Yet this observation proves no more than
the equally true fact that I lectured on Procedure and International Law to my friend, Professor
Goldsmith, when he was a student at Yale Law School. Presumably, the judges in these human
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Bradley and Goldsmith's misunderstanding of process also leads
them to attack current international human rights litigation, based on
the mistaken notion that such litigation rests on a "new," subversive
form of customary international law. The political branches, they sug-
gest, have appropriately incorporated most of the "old" customary in-
ternational law into U.S. domestic law, while properly resisting incor-
poration of the "new," less democratic human rights law. To reinforce
this gatekeeping function, they argue, the entire tradition of treating
customary international law as federal law ought now be deemed con-
stitutionally illegitimate.
Initially, Bradley and Goldsmith took pains to concede the exis-
tence of some legitimate avenues through which human rights litiga-
tion might be sustained. 193 They acknowledged a range of theories
under which federal courts could, consistently with separation of pow-
ers, construe these statutes to create federal common law rules of civil
liability to redress international crimes. 194  But in response to their
critics, they have hardened their position and moved to categorical
declarations about the "current illegitimacy of international human
rights litigation" under the ATCA and the TVPA.' 95
Given that others have fully rebutted the specifics of their chal-
lenge, I need not repeat those arguments here. 196 Suffice it to say that
no clear line separates the "old" from the "new" customary interna-
tional law because both have influenced American law through pre-
cisely the same transnational legal process.' 97 Nor is there anything
"modern," unconstitutional, or undemocratic about the way that hu-
man rights norms - in contrast to any other norms of customary in-
ternational law - have entered American law. It was largely through
American political leadership that human rights norms first entered
rights seminars have reached their own independent views about the domestic status of customary
international law, in the same way that Professor Goldsmith has reached his.
193 They argued that adoption of their viewpoint and "rejection of the modem position would
not necessarily spell the end for modem human rights litigation." Bradley & Goldsmith, Custom-
ary International Law, supra note u, at 872.
194 See id. at 872-73 & nn.352-56.
195 Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note i5, at 319. In particular, they have
examined, and found insufficient, Congress's "explicit political authorization" of international
human rights litigation in the ATCA and the TVPA. Id. at 356.
196 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 17, at 513-28.
197 Bradley and Goldsmith claim that the "new CIL" of human rights somehow differs funda-
mentally from "traditional CIL," inasmuch as "(iut is less tied to state practice, it can develop rap-
idly, and it increasingly purports to regulate a state's treatment of its citizens." Bradley & Gold-
smith, Customary International Law, supra note ii, at 842. But precisely the same could be said
of the ancient lex mercatoria, which was tied to the practice of business among the Mediterranean
states, developed rapidly, and was often applied as internal domestic law, as was shown in Swift
v. Tyson itself. See Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L LJ. 221, 224-29 (1978); sources cited supra note
32.
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the discourse of international law, and through American courts that
many of those norms have been substantially advanced.
Whether "old" or "new," international law norms do not bind fed-
eral courts until they have ripened into customary law rules. Some-
times, as in the case of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the executive branch takes the lead in incorporating such
norms into U.S. law. Sometimes Congress takes the lead, spurred by
nongovernmental organizations. 19 In recent human rights cases, fed-
eral courts have taken the lead, but only with the express congressional
directives in the ATCA and the TVPA.
We should not forget that all three branches of the federal govern-
ment have a say in deciding whether international human rights cases
will proceed to final judgment in U.S. courts. Federal judges need not
apply overbroad jurisdictional rules that dismiss all international hu-
man rights cases as inherently unfit for domestic adjudication. In-
stead, they may address the valid concerns that may arise involving
comity, separation of powers, and judicial incompetence through "doc-
trinal targeting": case-by-case application of existing doctrines to par-
ticular norms and fact patterns. 199 The executive branch may, and
frequently does, appear before the courts to urge particular outcomes
in human rights cases.200 When the executive branch has appeared, it
has accepted neither Bradley and Goldsmith's claim about the illegiti-
macy of such litigation, nor their broader assertion about the non-
federal status of customary international law. Finally, as Judge John
M. Walker, Jr. has recently noted:
[The ATCA] is simply an act of Congress. If it raises valid policy concerns
and if adjudication under it leads to real-world problems for the executive
or the legislature, it may be amended, or even repealed. The fact that
Congress has not done so, and, indeed, appears to have endorsed the Fi-
lartiga approach in the legislative history of the Torture Victim Protection
Act, indicates that the substantial concerns that have been voiced are, at
least at this point, largely theoretical. This minimizes any worry that the
judiciary, while finding specific authority in a specific Congressional en-
actment, has somehow embarked on a course of permitting a remedy for
human rights violations that Congress never intended, or that will unduly
interfere with the functioning of the other branches of government.
20 1
198 See supra notes 83 (law of the sea), iog (legislation incorporating international law norms at
the urging of human rights non-governmental organizations). For a parallel discussion of the re-
spective role of the courts, executive, legislature, and private actors in promoting the pending in-
corporation of the European Convention of Human Rights into United Kingdom law, see Koh,
Why Nations Obey, cited above in note i8i, at page 2658.
199 Koh, supra note 3o, at 2382-94 (outlining how judges applying common law and procedural
doctrines may dispose of inappropriate human rights cases that may appear on their dockets).
200 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 198o); supra notes 96-1o4.
201 The Honorable John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of International Human Rights
Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. Louis U. LJ. 539, 56o (x997).
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VI. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, Bradley and Goldsmith miss both their large
and their small targets. History, doctrine, the Constitution, and "de-
mocracy" all fail to support their broader claim that at this late date,
customary international law should be ousted from federal law. If
their real target is current human rights litigation, that practice also
rests on firmly established historical, legislative, and doctrinal footings.
On examination, Bradley and Goldsmith's thesis should lack ap-
peal even for those who fully embrace their values. Treating interna-
tional law as some species of state law does not foster original intent,
states' rights, judicial restraint, executive discretion, or democratic de-
cisionmaking.
When all is said and done, my point is simple: conventional wis-
doms are often right. "International law is federal law" is one exam-
ple. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" is another.
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